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r IS THIS REALLY NECESSARY? 
AIRLINE DEREGULATION: 
CRASH LANDINGS AND THE 
PARACHUTE OF ARISTOTLE 
Having collected almost 100,000 fre-
quent flyer miles on USAir, I decided to 
visit my son at his school in North 
Carolina. I got my "certificate" and called 
USAir over one month before the flight. 
This was October, not a holiday in sight. I 
asked for a reservation. All flights were 
open-I could fly direct, and I could leave 
whenever I wanted. Then I mentioned that 
this would be paid by a frequent flyer 
mileage certificate. "Oh, well, we do not 
have space for you on any of those 
flights," Fay of US Air explained in a prac-
ticed monotone. "Well, what do you 
have?" "We have a red-eye going into 
Pittsburgh which will connect into North 
Carolina the next day, and the trip back is 
pretty much the same; it will have to be the 
all-nighter with two stops and plane chan-
ges, taking a day and a half." "Wait a 
second, a moment ago you told me you 
had space everywhere. Now you have 
nothing and the flight's more than a month 
away in a non-traffic period. How come?" 
"Well, we only allocate some of our seats 
for the frequent flyer program." "Oh, I 
don't remember seeing that in the ad ... how 
many seats on the twelve direct flights I 
cannot get have you reserved for frequent 
flyers?" "I cannot give you that informa-
tion." 
Airline Deceptive Practices 
I had just been the victim of a classic 
"bait and switch" unlawful business prac-
tice. You advertise a benefit to bait con-
sumers; then you either disparage or even 
refuse to provide the advertised bargain, 
"switching" the consumer to a high-profit 
product or service. 1 
And it wasn't just USAir. Southwest 
Airlines did the same thing the following 
year. They widely advertised their "buddy 
fare" -on certain flights over certain 
periods, buy one ticket and get another for 
your buddy for free. But it turns out they 
do the same thing-reserve a very small 
number of seats for the program to attract 
customers, and then force them to pay full 
fare in order to get the flights they need. 
Then I got my American Airlines 
mileage statement. They have now 
declared that my mileage may "expire" 
and they are going to start subtracting 
mileage earned more than a given number 
of years ago. Needless to say, this was not 
the focus of the "American Advantage" 
advertising campaign when I signed up. 
These and other airline deceits are jus-
tified on an interesting legal basis. To 
those who object, the airlines point to a 
small-print clause in an obscure document 
saying that "rules are subject to change." 
In other words, we can promise you 
whatever we want, but we will not be held 
to our representations because of a 
clause-which we wrote-giving us the 
right to change the rules anytime we want 
to do so. We reserve the right to give 
ourselves permission to lie to you. This 
theory has never been tested in court as a 
defense, probably because no attorney 
wants to risk the ridicule of raising it. 
Airline Unfair Practices and 
Anticompetitive Results 
These practices are, regrettably, 
symptomatic of a much deeper malaise 
affecting the nation's air carriers. Beyond 
the open gauntlet of advertising deceit is 
a collection of competitive abuses war-
ranting greater concern. Most of them 
have arisen following the Airline 
Deregulation Act of 19782 and the sub-
sequent dismantling of the Civil 
Aeronautics Board in I 985. First, there 
has been increasing concentration of 
ownership. During the last quarter of 
1986, a spate of mergers occurred, and the 
trend is clearly in the direction of con-
solidation. In California's market alone, 
USAir bought out PSA, American Airlines 
gobbled up AirCalifomia, Delta took over 
Western Airlines, and Alaska Airlines cap-
tured Jet America. 
Although economists will point to 
theoretical "ease of entry" into the airline 
industry, one has to have gates at the air-
ports. Major airports grant long-term 
leases; Los Angeles and San Francisco 
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airport leases, for example, last from ten 
to thirty years. Buying a competitor, or 
driving him out of business, may not result 
in effective new competitive entry. 
Second, the contest to decide who is 
bought or driven out is not based neces-
sarily on fair market competition where 
the firm with the best service or most 
efficient operation prevails. For example, 
some airlines control the travel agency 
computer systems booking much of the 
nation's travel. When the system of 
American Airlines or United Airlines is 
used, one does not have to guess to predict 
that the layout of fares, the orderof presen-
tation, and other marketing techniques 
used by the airlines controlling the com-
puter booking systems will favor their 
own flights. Of course they do. 
But the most major unfair practice cur-
rently extant and thriving favors the "deep 
pocket" carrier, or the carrier with an area 
of monopoly power which may be ex-
ploited to cross-subsidize operations 
where it has competition. The consumers 
in the monopoly market are egregiously 
overcharged so that one competitor may 
drive out of business possibly more effi-
cient carriers in another market. 
The competitive pattern in this in-
dustry has increasingly degenerated into 
price discrimination and predation, lead-
ing to bankruptcies and "industry 
shakeouts," which then become tight 
oligopolies acting as cartels. That is, once 
the aggressive price competitors are either 
purchased or driven out, the sagacious 
deep pocket survivor will likely benefit 
from a resulting "I will fight no more 
forever" oligopoly-the economic term 
for a shared monopoly.3 
If one of the carriers is particularly 
large, it will likely set the rates. Quite apart 
from the mutual advantage, none of the 
small competitors dares to compete if it 
believes that the larger firm can and will 
go below cost if it is sufficiently irritated, 
financed by either its larger size or by its 
surfeit of monopoly business in other 
markets.4 
To be sure, the model of the free market 
may dictate a challenge where prices are 
excessive. The reality, however, usually is 
not a challenge, but conservative actions 
to maintain the small marketshare which 
gives the large entrepreneur "cover"-the 
patina of a non-monopoly-while all par-
ticipants eventually move toward the ex-
traction of excessively high prices. This is 
not a zero sum game; it is better to achieve 
a mgher rate of return on a small market-
share than to risk a competitive war which 
will have to be lost by you. And once the 
large entrepreneur has actually demon-
strated a willingness to go below cost to 
Ir 
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drive others out, the lesson is easily 
learned. In the real world, entrepreneurs 
would rather make friends with a stronger 
bully than risk annihilation-so long as 
the bully makes room for their comfort-
able operation. Although at odds with 
economic theory, this human pattern 
seems rather obvious to anyone who is not 
seeking-or has not already obtained-a 
Nobel prize in economics. 
This predictable pattern is exactly 
what has been happening in the airline 
industry: occasional but vicious price 
wars, followed by bankruptcies, mergers, 
and then oligopoly leading to price in-
creases and service diminution. When 
they see this dynamic, the free market-
obeisant economists like to argue that all 
is well-the market is supposed to shake 
out the inefficient. True, but the market 
should be doing so based on performance 
in the marketplace and the exercise of 
consumer choice, not based on deep pock-
ets or unfair practices. And the result 
should allow continued new entry and 
vibrant competition between the increas-
ingly efficient survivors. That is not what 
is happening. 
Let's take an example. On March 6, 
1990, it cost $480 to fly round-trip from 
San Diego to Sacramento. One could fly 
to Europe for less than it cost to go from 
California's second largest city to its capi-
tal. [Of course, the airlines are smart 
enough to give a huge discount to legis-
lators and government personnel, who fly 
at one-fourth the regular price.] The 
market was a tight oligopoly with USAir 
as price leader. Southwest Airlines was 
virtually the only competitor "on the 
make" and willing to price independently. 
But Southwest did not then serve San 
Diego-Sacramento. A lack of airport gates 
in Sacramento was one impediment. But 
in markets where Southwest offers com-
petition to these same carriers, fares are 
one-fourth to one-third the per passenger 
mile rate of the $480 San Diego-
Sacramento charge. Thankfully for some 
of us, Southwest entered Sacramento; im-
mediately, fares from San Diego to 
Sacramento were magically cut to one-
fourth the previous level. 
This pattern is not one of fair or effec-
tive competition. It is one of price dis-
crimination and predation. USAir is deter-
mined to drive Southwest out of busi-
ness-not by providing better or less ex-
pensive service, but by cross-subsidizing 
from excessive charges where it does not 
face Southwest competition to accom-
modate very low fares where Southwest 
appears. 
This pattern appears to mimic to some 
extent the pricing expected during healthy 
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price competition, except it has two draw-
backs. First, while it is going on, it grossly 
misallocates resources. Passengers pay 
distorted prices where carriers are not 
engaged in battle. For example, Alaska 
Airlines has a virtual monopoly on intra-
Alaska air travel. It is not surprising that 
the fares from Juneau to Anchorage, Fair-
banks, or other cities in Alaska are much, 
much higher per passenger mile than they 
are in Alaska's California operations 
(where it faces competition from South-
west). Alaska also uses its reservoir of 
monopoly power to finance its contest in 
California. While this is going on, people 
travelling in Alaska are paying unfair and 
excessive charges for air travel. 
Second, although those of us in San 
Diego are delighted to be the subject of a 
price war, it is a Pyrrhic and temporary 
victory for us. At some point the war will 
end, usually one of three ways: Southwest 
will be bought out to get rid of the an-
noyance; Southwest will be driven out of 
business; Southwest will join the club. 
Then prices will go up-and if there is not 
another Southwest in the wings (sorry) to 
challenge prices and go for marketshare, 
the prices will rise slowly but inexorably 
without the benefit of service, efficiency, 
or other entrepreneurial improvement. 
Needed: Refined Regulation 
So are we saying that the airlines 
should not be deregulated? No, the 
regulatory system in place twenty years 
ago was fundamentally a cartel operation 
protecting the most inefficient carriers 
from competition. In fact, the net effect of 
deregulation has been positive. But the 
long-range prognosis is bleak. Because in 
the process of deregulation, the govern-
ment has not fully absorbed the obvious: 
that the choice is not between regulating 
to the maximum comfort of those regu-
lated and a competitive system where they 
do whatever the hell they want. 
Another model exists-one of refined 
regulation. It is governed by the following 
maxim: We stimulate maximum competi-
tion, but we regulate in a targeted fashion 
where market prerequisites preclude ef-
fective competition or where there are ex-
ternal costs in the absence of regulation. 
We may want to deregulate an industry-
that is, end an intrusive paternalistic sys-
tem of price controls, entry barriers, 
licensing, standards, and the rest of it. But 
we need not do so carte blanche. We may 
decide not to deregulate as to a part of an 
industry where competition is lacking; 
and where we do rely substantially on 
competition, we maintain the deceptive 
advertising, antitrust, and unfair competi-
tion prohibitions which properly apply to 
the competitive sector. 
At least theoretically, the Gompetitive 
sector of the marketplace is also subject to 
societal safeguards and limitations. If you 
lie, you are punished. Deceptive advertis-
ing is actionable. You cannot engage in 
unfair competition without sanction. Price 
discrimination with the intent or effect of 
lessening competition is unlawful. 
Predatory practices violate Business and 
Professions Code section 17000 et seq. 
And so on. Not only are these laws applied 
properly to this particular industry, but 
much greater scrutiny is justifiable given 
the common carrier nature of the industry 
and the tendency toward oligopoly. And 
finally, where the passenger volume or 
other market features are not amenable to 
real and continuing competition, there 
must be regulatory oversight-including 
rate review. The framework underlying 
these positions should not be controver-
sial. Economic actors have a choice: either 
they compete in a fair and useful manner 
or, if they degenerate to a structure inhibit-
ing price competition and noncompetitive 
prices are likely, they are regulated. You 
either compete or, if you have a monopoly 
or cartel, you are regulated in a way to 
preclude the abuses flowing from that lack 
of competition. You do not get the cartel 
and a blank check for the public to sign. 
That is the principle. And it is that basic. 
Applying this principle of refined 
regulation to airlines or insurance or the 
plethora of other businesses to which it 
should apply is not difficult. Either a 
relevant submarket in a given geographic 
market of such an industry has workable 
and effective competition or it does not. If 
it does, regulate only as you do the com-
petitive sector generally-for deceptive 
advertising, antitrust, unfair competition, 
and perhaps to inhibit or assess external 
costs (e.g., pollution or safety). But these 
areas are not subject to barriers to entry, 
rate controls, detailed standards, and 
agency supervision. If effective competi-
tion is lacking, then target the regulation 
to prevent the abuse arising from the 
market flaw at issue. 
This means that we properly do not 
"deregulate" all airline markets or, as we 
discuss in the comment below, all in-
surance or all aspects of savings and loans. 
We discriminate based on the economic 
condition and state of competition within 
relevant markets-conditions which may 
vary within an industry. And we may 
properly regulate competitors in one 
market as to maximum price, while allow-
ing competition to dictate prices for the 
very same industry with other competitors 
and a different economic reality some-
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place else. It is possible to distinguish 
between situations where you regulate and 
situations where you do not, and that need 
may vary within a single industry. Hence, 
the pattern we now insist upon-we either 
regulate or we do not regulate, without 
regard to particulars-is wrong. It is 
universal, but it is wrong. 
In the case of airline regulation, as with 
many others, we commit the sin of 
generality-applying the same basic sys-
tem across markets of varying regulatory 
need. We impose a single cookie cutter, as 
if it is impossible to vary the system within 
a single industry and its regulatory 
scheme. And the cookie cutter-either all 
regulation or total passivity-is applied in 
extremis reflecting excess in one direc-
tion, and then the other, seriatim. First, we 
have no regulation at all. Then airlines are 
subjected to detailed regulation by the 
Federal Aviation Administration and the 
Civil Aeronautics Board covering fares, 
routes, and virtually all aspects of opera-
tion. 5 Then when we wake up and realize 
that we have been running a cartel at 
public expense, we deregulate. But in 
doing so, we move to the other extreme 
and regulate nothing. We forget about 
deceptive advertising law. We forget about 
basic antitrust and unfair competition law. 
We lack the ability to differentiate what 
should be regulated and the ability to 
gauge when it should occur, so we don't 
do it at all, even in some markets which 
have only one carrier and monopoly 
power prices become obvious. This will 
probably go on until the abuse becomes so 
egregious that political pressure builds. 
Then there will be the inevitable ex-
plosion, sad tales, dramatic testimony, 
media exposes, and we' II move back again 
to gratuitous, costly, and unnecessary 
regulation-eventually controlled by the 
industry and inevitably framed to keep the 
most inefficient carrier in the history of the 
world in operation. 
The Prescription of Moderation 
Aristotle counselled "moderation, 
moderation in all things." His advice well 
applies to the state as regulator. Yes, try to 
let competition do 1t, but watch it careful-
ly, and enforce the laws refined over many 
years to assure a fair contest where con-
s um er sovereignty decides the 
marketplace winner. Then, where you find 
narrow areas and markets where the pre-
requisites to competition are not present-
as perhaps in lightly travelled airline 
markets-regulate in rifle-shot fashion to 
address the abuses created by those flaws. 
This might mean nothing more than 
limited maximum rate regulation where 
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oligopoly or monopoly occurs. Apply dif-
ferent degrees of regulation within the in-
dustry. Meanwhile, enforce strongly all of 
the safeguards against market abuse nor-
mally applied to preserve fair competition. 
Mattox II and the 
Pendulum Swing to Laissez Faire 
Proof of the extent of the "hear no evil, 
see no evil" problem in the airline industry 
as deregulation has led to a combination 
of classic competitive abuses is provided 
by the infamous Mattox II case of 1990,6 
recently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Morales v. TWA.7 
By way of background, the leading 
case in defining the primary jurisdiction of 
airline regulation has been for years Nader 
v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. 8 In Nader, the 
plaintiff had a confirmed reservation on an 
Allegheny flight. He was bumped and 
sought damages for breach of contract, et 
al. The defense asserted that the system of 
airline regulation by the Ci vii Aeronautics 
Board was comprehensive; because the 
Board (together with the FAA) regulated 
all aspects of the fare/reservation system 
as well as routes, baggage rules, and vir-
tually every aspect of airline practice, the 
common law of contracts and torts was 
superseded by this regulatory system. The 
defense buttressed its argument with the 
fact that the Board was indeed considering 
the issue of reservation bumping. The 
Supreme Court held that there was no 
absolute occupation of the field, and that 
unless the CAB specifically permitted a 
practice which breached a common law 
principle of contract or tort law, the under-
lying common law applied. The Nader 
case was allowed to proceed.9 
But now we have deregulation in the 
airline industry. We have decided to let the 
marketplace prevail in an industry which 
(economists point out) has small, discrete 
units of production which may be adjusted 
to traffic volume, moved, bought, and sold 
(the planes). Hence, so long as safety is 
assured, it is not a natural monopoly but is 
amenable to effective competition. Con-
gress removed most of the jurisdiction of 
the Civil Aeronautics Board and, with the 
enactment of the Sunset Act of 1984, the 
limited federal powers left were trans-
ferred to the Department of Transporta-
tion. This included the standard authority 
of all regulators to police deceptive adver-
tising. 
On November 14, 1988, the attorneys 
general of Texas and several other states 
notified TWA, Continental, and British 
Air that they were engaged in deceptive 
advertising under guidelines adopted by 
the National Association of Attorneys 
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General in 1987. What the airlines were 
doing was advertising a price, and then 
when the ticket was bought, adding on 
substantial "surcharges" for "fuel" and 
"tax." This allowed them to charge more 
than their competitors while advertising a 
lower price-which in tum forced com-
petitors to engage in like deception to 
compensate. The defense argued, in-
credibly, that state deceptive advertising 
statutes were preempted by the 
"regulatory" authority of the now fang less 
Department of Transportation-on the 
basis that it had been transferred the power 
to regulate deceptive advertising. The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals-in a 
decision which can only be described as 
bizarre-held that the current nonregula-
tion system preempts state regulation and 
state deceptive practice laws. Only the 
regulator (the Department of Transporta-
tion) may enforce them. Good luck. Fur-
ther, the court implied that this delegation 
of authority to DOT covers deceptive 
practices and all "unfair acts." Hence, un-
less DOT stops it, it's Katie bar the door. 
The Supreme Court's opinion on this 
issue is even worse. In a 5-3 decision, the 
Court held that the guidelines adopted by 
the National Association of Attorneys 
General, which required accurate dis-
closure of the exceptions and conditions 
to advertised "fare bargains," are 
economically undesirable. Its logic, 
drawn from the seemingly unfathomable 
well of University of Chicago ignorance, 
is that it is a good idea for the airlines to 
deceive people because more people are 
thusly attracted to the airlines, resulting in 
higher utilization and lower fares. 
I am not making this up. "Accordingly, 
airlines try to sell as many seats per flight 
as possible at higher prices to the first 
group [price-insensitive business 
travelers], and then to fill up the flight by 
selling seats at much lower prices to the 
second group [price-conscious pleasure 
travelers]. .. .In order for this marketing 
process to work, and for it ultimately to 
redound to the benefit of price-conscious 
travelers, the airlines must be able to place 
substantial restrictions on the availability 
of the lower priced seats (so as to sell as 
many seats as possible at the higher rate), 
and must be able to advertise the lower 
fares." 10 
Let's stop here for a moment. What the 
Court is here saying is that it is ideal to 
have "value of service" pricing, where the 
prices vary according to ability to pay. 
Such an arrangement only works in a car-
tel setting to extract monopoly power 
profits. In a competitive market, the busi-
ness fares would be cut until fully dis-




here pretending that the airline industry, 
instead of being a low-fixed-cost 
enterprise with small units of production 
(planes) highly mobile and able to adjust 
by route and schedule, is a high-fixed-cost 
enterprise with enormous unavoidable ex-
cess capacity requiring price reductions to 
marginal cost to maximize efficiency. 
This is, of course, mostly nonsense. 
Certainly, few if any economists ever to 
study this industry would agree with the 
economic underpinnings of the Court's 
view. But even if one were to posit the 
need for fare reductions to prevent empty 
seats, it is possible to do so without lying. 
Instead, the Court notes that "requiring too 
much information in advertisements can 
have the paradoxical effect of stifling the 
information that customers receive." 11 
The attorneys general were not suggesting 
the reprinting of the telephone-book-sized 
tariffs with every advertisement, but the 
prohibition of deceit. It is possible to ad-
vertise a lower rate, even one with condi-
tions, clearly and without deception. 
Every other industry is theoretically under 
such an obligation. And it is important that 
this obligation not be subject to only one 
single means of enforcement. The 
American system of checks and balances 
works because we do not vest in a single 
entity final authority to create or continue 
an abuse. Virtually every other industry 
subject to regulatory control is also sub-
ject to public prosecutor or private suit 
where it deceives. That multitude of alter-
native enforcers creates an important 
check. The Supreme Court's option, with 
little support in the legislative history 
cited, confines this important check to a 
single institution-and one historically 
vulnerable to corruptive capture. 
We have moved from a system of in-
dustry sycophants protecting existing air 
carriers from competition to a system run 
by ideologues who have infinite faith in a 
market god which deserves a measure of 
respect but which is not properly deified. 
There is ground in the middle. To occupy 
it requires a sense of particularity; a will-
ingness to regulate sometimes and some-
places, and to know why one and not the 
other. 
Perhaps, perchance, somewhere along 
the evolutionary cycle, and before the end 
of time, someone will set the pendulum in 
the middle. Let us all hope we shall not 
have to wait the eons necessary before we 
are graced by another Aristotle to teach us 
the simplest of truths to still its swing: 
moderation, moderation in all things. 
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FOOTNOTES 
I. Often, bait and switch is ac-
complished by stocking or obtaining a 
limited number of the bargain "bait" ad-
vertised, knowing that only a small 
proportion of those who are likely to 
respond to the ad will be able to obtain it. 
The limited numbers available are not dis-
closed. Here, the offense is particularly 
egregious because USAir cannot argue, as 
is common: "I only bought nine of those 
low-priced stereos (although I advertised 
to two million people) because nine was 
all I could get." Here, the limitation on 
supply is self-created and gratuitously 
manipulated. They have the product 
promised; it is available-but only if you 
pay full fare. For a discussion of the cir-
cumstantial evidence sufficient to estab-
lish bait and switch practices, see Tashof 
v. FTC, 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
2. 49 App. U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. 
3. If only two to six carriers dominate 
a certain route, there may well be implicit 
collusion at some point, particularly if 
they learn of each other's fares at or before 
effectuation. In the Jong run, lowering 
fares will simply result in reductions by 
competitors, leading to the gradual 
realization that following a price leader up 
in an eventually established pattern 
benefits all of the participants-it is not a 
zero sum game, and all can win at the 
expense of the consumer. 
4. Although free market economists 
like to deny the possibility of such be-
havior, it is easily demonstrable. 
Businesspersons do not, in fact, conform 
to the mindset as attributed by economists. 
That is, they are not idiots. Typically, free 
market economists like to argue that such 
an oligopoly will not deviate from proper-
ly competitive prices because the low bar-
riers to entry will attract newcomers if the 
large firm starts to go too high, and that 
the smaller existing competitors will also 
likely lower prices to attract a larger 
marketshare. Such an analysis 
misunderstands human psychology. The 
new entrant and the existing smaller car-
rier will not challenge the market leader if 
they believe that the leader will retaliate 
by going below cost to hurt them. They 
believe in maximum revenues as 
economists assume, but they believe more 
strongly in survival, which economists do 
not assume. Perhaps one of the problems 
is the difficulty of quantifying the desire 
for security. Economists tend to think that 
if something cannot be quantified, it does 
not exist. 
5. See, for example, the proceedings 
necessary to obtain but a third carrier from 
San Francisco/Oakland to New 
York/Newark in 29 C.A.B. 811 ( 1959). 
6. TWA v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, _U.S._, 111 S.Ct. 
307 ( 1990), later proceedings, 924 F.2d 
I 055 (5th Cir. I 991 ), 949 F.2d I 4 I (5th 
Cir. 1991), afj'd in part and rev'd in part 
sub nom. Morales v. TWA, et al., 
_U.S._, 60 U.S.L.W. 4444 (June I, 
1992). 
7. Morales v. TWA, _U.S. __ , 60 
U.S.L.W. 4444 (June I, 1992). 
8. 426 U.S. 290 (1976). 
9. The Nader decision is consistent 
with the notion of coextensivity of 
remedy. The Court viewed itself as the 
decisionmaker for basic societal contract 
and tort disputes; it is not displaced merely 
because of the presence of a regulatory 
system unless that system has previously 
considered and ruled contrary to the un-
derlying common law policy. The ap-
proach of that Court-but certainly not the 
Morales Court-is well vindicated by a 
Jong series of plaintiff cases across a 
panoply of abuses theoretically addres-
sable by regulatory agencies. The most 
serious abuses within the real estate in-
dustry (multiple listing group boycotts, 
extortionate behavior, price fixing), bank-
ing industry (NSF check overcharges and 
impound account excesses), insurance in-
dustry (bad faith refusal to pay claims), 
and many others have been brought before 
the courts and adjudicated favorably to 
plaintiffs. None of them were brought by 
regulators. Although each industry has 
comprehensive regulatory systems, none 
ever entertained these problems-not-
withstanding decades of abuse and the 
violation of numerous statutes. 
IO. Morales v. TWA, supra note 7. 
11. Id. 
BEYOND AIRLINES: 
THE FAILURES OF MODERN 
DEREGULATION 
To regulate or not to regulate; that is 
not the question. As we argue above, we 
are jeopardizing the deregulation of air-
lines by assuming that the question is one 
of paternalistic control industry-wide, or 
abandonment to competition-even 
where unfair or ineffective. We have failed 
to deregulate intelligently, to apply refined 
regulation, and to continue deceptive ad-
vertising and fair competition enforce-
ment which maintains the ground rules 
making competition effective. Not only in 
the airline industry, but in trucking, 
savings and loans, banking, cable 
television service, local exclusive 
franchises, and more recently in telecom-
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munications have we not learned the les-
son of Aristotle preached in the comment 
above. 
The errors in each case have a common 
thread: an inability to understand that the 
issue is not whether to regulate, but how 
to regulate. There is always some degree 
of regulation; even in the Smithian wel-
tanschauung of University of Chicago 
naivete, the marketplace is defined by the 
larger society. The rules and mores of 
transactions are unavoidable. I have put 
my manufactured article on the truck to go 
to your store; if it is damaged, who pays? 
If the smoke from my stack prevents you 
from using your property nearby or injures 
your family, do I pay the damages so 
created or not? All sorts of complicated 
rules exist; they cannot be avoided. From 
bills of lading to the meaning of warran-
ties, the issue is never whether there 
should be some sort of interference in a 
"natural marketplace." There is no natural 
marketplace; there never has been one. Its 
invocation is simply a device to beg the 
issues (what are the rules? how much in-
terference should there be? for what pur-
pose? in what manner?) so they are not 
decided or addressed. 
What we have done repeatedly is to 
subject whole areas of the economy to 
substantial regulation, and then as the 
political pendulum swings to the right, we 
have deregulated. But time after time we 
have done so by the act of simple release 
from the previous regime of regulation. 
We have done so as if there is some kind 
of natural law to which all such systems 
will return upon the mere withdrawal of 
the state. The state is the '·'problem," and 
its removal subjects the industry to the 
beneficence of the invisible hand. Regret-
tably, most of the impetus behind this as-
sumption emanates from a school of free 
market economics whose adherents are 
more akin to disciples than to scholars. 
They do not pursue truth; they manifest 
faith in a doctrine with all of the charac-
teristics of a religion. And their system of 
belief has the basic attraction of religious 
doctrine: Its rules are internally consistent, 
and it seems to explain almost every-
thing.1 
But often our systems of regulation 
which we have created were designed to 
address market flaws which remain after 
deregulation and warrant some adjust-
ment. Often, the act of regulation itself has 
created market flaws which are exploited 
during the deregulation transformation. 
The market is, indeed, a force to be-
hold. And its benefits are now being ac-
knowledged across a panoply of varied 
cultures and in the homes of its ancient 
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enemies. So use the market, consider the 
market, give it presumptive status per-
haps, look for ways to interject its ability 
to allocate resources with efficiency and 
in response to arguably the purest of 
democratic forces-votes by purchase. 
But understand what the prerequisites are 
for market function consistent with its 
beneficial features. Understand the nature 
of its limitations and of the flaws which it 
may well carry. Consider scarcity, natural 
monopoly, imperfect information, ad-
hesion, economic coercion or bullying, 
collusion, deceit, external benefits, exter-
nal costs. 
Error#l: Overregulation 
There are two extremes in juxtaposing 
the flaws of the marketplace against its 
benefits. The first extreme is to use the 
existence of flaws as an excuse to abrogate 
the benefits of the marketplace in unjus-
tified ways. The trucking industry has ac-
complished this by claiming that mini-
mum and collusively set prices are neces-
sary in order to assure a margin of profit 
for trucking to finance safety standards. 
The common justification for regulation is 
to find some health and safety string, and 
pull it. 
Modern courts have long since sur-
rendered their role as a constitutional 
check on meritless economic regulation-
all that is required is the invocation of 
"safety" or "health." Never mind that 
there is no real nexus between the 
regulatory system and the value invoked 
to justify it. Giving truckers a price floor 
may guarantee more revenue and may 
keep in business more marginal carriers, 
but it does not assure that the extra money 
is spent on safety. There are ways to en-
courage safe performance without 
wholesale pricing freedom with proceeds 
to be spent wherever the recipient desires. 
There are many alternative regulatory 
means which connect to the safety or other 
justification. But the courts do not want to 
examine the difficult justifications. They 
do not want to challenge either the exper-
tise or the good faith of legislators or 
regulators. They want a bright-line test. 
Invoking a health and safety concern 
seems to provide it. 
The result of this judicial license, and 
the political power of profit-stake inter-
ests, has been a great deal of unnecessary 
regulation for cartel purposes. When the 
Board of Landscape Architects decides to 
license those who design golf courses to 
confine such business to California "ar-
chitects," it is hardly protecting con-
sumers needing the state's assurance of 
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competence (the justification for most 
licensing regulatory systems). When the 
Board of Accountancy, consisting in 
majority of practicing certified public ac-
countants, adopts a rule providing that 
only CPAs may use the word "accounting" 
or "accountant" in describing their ser-
vices, it is not regulating for public health 
or safety-although it is assuredly in-
voked. When marketing orders use the 
power of the state to tax consumers of 
wine, milk, cheese, eggs, avocados, and 
beef to finance promotional ads stimulat-
ing increased consumption of these sup-
posedly under-ingested products, health 
and safety justifications are certain to be 
catechistically invoked-and will suffice 
to sustain the regulatory act. 
Error #2: Underregulation 
The second extreme is represented by 
airline regulation discussed above, but 
hardly confined to it. It occurs usually 
following deregulation. Telecommunica-
tions have been deregulated and the net 
effect, as with airline deregulation, has 
been beneficial-at least for the short run. 
But here also regulators have gone to the 
other extreme and are allowing monopoly 
loop operations which remain to give 
cross-subsidy advantage to the utility as it 
competes in the private competitive sec-
tor. The regulator is not watching below-
cost practices. The regulator is permitting 
the monopoly loop to obtain excess profits 
by allowing rate increases by pass-
through formulae. The long-run result 
may be highly damaging because the same 
basic error is being made as with airline 
deregulation: In moving from regulation 
to deregulation, there is excessive reliance 
on a marketplace where there are serious 
anomalies. Where the existence of strong 
monopoly power and the underlying im-
portance of the industry dictate more 
vigilant application of standard antitrust 
and unfair practices law, it is instead 
suspended or waived to allow the abuses 
which led to the regulation in the first 
place to proliferate. 
Other examples loom around us. The 
allowance of exclusive franchises-law-
ful monopolies-by local governments 
for trash hauling or cable service, for ex-
ample, may be arranged without the re-
quirement of competitive bidding or rate 
regulation. State law understandably 
prohibits our cities and counties from let-
ting a public construction project of over 
$10,000 without competitive bidding be-
cause of the corruption which has resulted 
historically from bribery to obtain local 
business. But in the deregulation of local 
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government activities and of cable, we 
allow multi-million-dollar exclusive 
franchises to be awarded without any bid-
ding and without any required or likely 
rate regulation. And the local jurisdiction 
may collect a "franchise fee" based on a 
percentage of the take-reducing further 
the impetus to regulate. 
And, of course, the ultimate example 
we have just all experienced: the savings 
and loan debacle. Same story, lesson still 
not learned. When we determined it ad-
visable to deregulate savings and loans to 
make them more "flexibly able" to com-
pete with other financial institutions, did 
we calculate fully the market-affecting 
consequences of federally insured 
deposits assuring them profits if they won 
and publicly financed relief if they lost? 
Did we deregulate thoughtfully, taking 
into account market flaws and human na-
ture? The question is now regrettably 
rhetorical. 
Error #3: The Failure to Refine 
Regulation 
Sometimes an industry requires tight 
price regulation in one of its relevant 
geographic or product markets, and some-
times it does not. Natural monopoly, for 
example, warrants maximum price regula-
tion-and there may be markets in many 
industries which may be served efficiently 
by only one provider while much of the 
industry is subject to meaningful price 
competition. Why must we either over-
regulate the entire industry, or ignore what 
are obvious regulatory needs? In addition 
to enforcing generic statutes designed to 
protect the marketplace where it can 
potentially work (deceptive advertising 
statutes, antitrust law, unfair practices 
prohibitions), we can arrange for condi-
tional maximum rate and entry controls-
where natural monopoly or other flaws 
preclude its efficacy. 
As we argue above, airline regulation 
is a prime candidate for both vigorous 
competition in some markets--enhanced 
by enforcement of those laws designed to 
further fair competition-and perhaps for 
specific entry and maximum rate controls 
in markets where the limited number of 
viable competitors precludes real com-
petition. 
Another prime example is insurance 
regulation. In most states, there is both 
exemption from antitrust laws-no as-
sured competition-and little meaningful 
regulation. The worst of all worlds. In 
California, we certainly improved matters 
by subjecting the industry to antitrust law 
through Proposition 103 in 1988. And the 
proposition was sophisticated enough to 
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recognize that elements of both competi-
tion and regulation are appropriate within 
a single complex industry. However, the 
proposition failed to take the final step. 
Rate review is triggered by the size of an 
increase proposed by an insurance com-
pany.2 The optimum system would ex-
amine the insurance submarkets and re-
quire rate-of-return maximum rate regula-
tion for any such submarket where avail-
able tests for workable competition are not 
met. If they are met, the rates would be set 
by the marketplace. Review would not 
occur. If competition is lacking to assure 
market-set prices, there is a fair rate of 
return review, whatever the rate proposed. 
Such a system obeys the basic prescription 
we here advance: If there is a reason to 
regulate, regulate there and to that extent. 
Apply the rule where there is the reason 
for the rule. 
What is interesting is the extent to 
which we sometimes are so unrefined in 
our regulatory systems that we overregu-
late and underregulate within the same 
system. That is, we quite often overregu-
late in the formulation of entry barriers. 
Not only is the admission to an industry, 
trade, or profession often too high, but it 
is often unrelated to the purpose of the 
regulation. A refined system of regulation 
requires the system to address its raison 
d'etre time and again. But attorneys are 
licensed based on a single general ex-
amination at the age of 25-never to be 
tested again, and never tested in the actual 
area where their skills are relied upon. The 
same goes for physicians. Here are two 
areas where regulation is amply jus-
tified-we properly do not rely on the 
marketplace. But then what do we do? We 
regulate in a way very distantly related to 
our purpose. The result is that we do not 
optimally accomplish our purpose. A 
refined system of regulation of attorneys 
would test attorneys in their actual area of 
practice, be it immigration, antitrust, 
criminal, or tax law. The examination 
would not be difficult or off-point, but 
would ascertain that the practitioner in 
that area knows the basic cases and under-
stands the basic procedures. The test 
would be given once every five years to 
assure continued competence. The same 
process would rightfully guide physician 
licensure. The underlying principle? 
Regulate narrowly and specifically to ac-
complish the stated goal. 
The most egregious example of the 
blunderbuss "know nothing" school of 
public policy is easily found at the highest 
levels. Take the Dan Quayle Council on 
Competitiveness. This Council has taken 
over the role of the previous "Bush Task 
Force"; that is, it oversees the regulatory 
review functions of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (0MB) exercised 
through the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs. Operating outside due 
process, the Administrative Procedure 
Act, public review, the hearing process, et 
al., this group can pull any federal regula-
tion it dislikes for "review." Instead of 
following a procedure where financially 
neutral officials representing the long-
range interests of the people hear evidence 
from all sides, duly noticed, and in public, 
we have the spectacle of those with a 
vested profit stake in policies engaging in 
private appeals to officials who have not 
weighed the evidence, but who are-let's 
face it-more interested in the weight of 
available campaign gold than in the 
weight of evidence. This is not refined 
regulation. 
The "Council" is now pushing a 
"moratorium" on regulation-all of it-so 
business can recover. It pleads that it will 
except serious health and safety related 
rules from the ban. But that is hardly 
refined. Many rules prohibiting corrupt 
business practices are rightfully imple-
mented; many rules are desired by honest 
businesses knowing that the failure to 
adopt an industry-wide standard means 
that they are forced into injurious practice 
themselves to stay even with competitors. 
Sometimes a standard must be imposed 
from the outside and across the board for 
the benefit of all. The whole notion of a 
"moratorium" rests on the demagogic and 
lazy assumption that all rules are the same, 
or that perhaps they can be divided easily 
into two categories: those necessary for 
health and safety, which are okay, and all 
the rest, which are not. Some rules are 
unnecessary, gratuitous, self-serving, and 
more costly than alternatives-including 
their nullification. Others are important 
for many reasons. But they have to be 
analyzed on their merits. One cannot say 
with any intellectual honesty that a regula-
tion is "bad" or "good" without reference 
to what it does. Why is that so hard for 
some people to understand?3 
California has followed the federal ex-
ample with its own Ueberroth Competi-
tiveness Report. Here is the same problem. 
All would be better if government simply 
"got out." Got out of what? Where? Well, 
says Ueberroth, almost everywhere. 
Among other things, we should repeal the 
Corporate Criminal Liability Act. This is 
a law which makes the unremarkable 
statement that a corporate manager who 
knows of a "hidden defect" which is likely 
to cause death or great bodily injury has 
an obligation to notify the workers if it 
endangers them, or Cal-OSHA if it 
threatens consumers. Cal-OSHA is then 
The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 12, Nos. 2 & 3 (Spring/Summer 1992) 
supposed to notify the appropriate 
regulatory agency for a review. So if you 
find out a product of yours is going to 
cause people to die or become disabled, 
you have to tell an agency so they can 
check it out. Wow, that is certainly un-
reasonable. Query: Under what definition 
of civilization would we countenance the 
contrary proposition? If you know your 
product will kill and maim (through its 
normal and expected use), you shall (or 
may) keep it to yourself and let it happen 
without letting anyone know. But if we are 
in the world of the regulatory demagogue, 
that is fine, because we do not then engage 
in refined regulation; we engage in a series 
of caveperson grunts: regulation 
bad ... ugh ... business good .... regulation 
make business do things they no 
want. .. ugh, that bad .... regulation 
stop ... good happen ... belch. 
The import of all of this ponderous 
prose? The how of deregulation is as im-
portant as the threshold decision to 
deregulate. Too many treat the entire mat-
ter as a "yes" we regulate or "no" we do 
not, as if that decision ends the inquiry. As 
the current crop of twelve-year-olds likes 
to blurt .... NOT!! A decision to regulate, or 
to deregulate, begins the inquiry. But we 
seem unable to begin it. It's as if our 
policymakers have adopted the ten-
second attention span of the mass media. 
The airline industry has been joined by 
local government exclusive franchises 
(covering trash, sports arenas, ambulance 
services, et al.), telecommunications, 
savings and loans and financial institu-
tions, trucking, the cable industry. A long 
and costly line has marched before us, one 
that is apparently part of a long and costly 
line to come. Having ignored history, we 
seem condemned-as the cliche goes-to 
repeat it. The prediction is not meant to 
resonate cynicism, but the pendulum has 
swung from unfettered marketplace to 
overly burdensome regulation controlled 
by those on the inside, and now to ir-
responsible deregulation absent even the 
modicum of competition-maintaining and 
fairness-assuring measures we apply 
generally. 
The question before the house is not 
that we have erred; can there be any doubt 
of that? It is rather how much of a price we 
shall have to pay before we begin to think. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The market economist religion is 
actually built upon a traditional theism. 
There is an all-permeating god: the 
market. It is defined as whatever is after 
the removal of state "intrusion." If that 
market is left "alone" to function, all 
things will emerge as they should in the 
long run. Voltaire's Pan gloss has the same 
view in the classic essay Candide: All is 
as it should be no matter what happens 
because god controls all and all is accord-
ing to his plan; whatever happens is 
predestined to be for the best. There is 
precious little difference between the faith 
creating the "optimism" skewered so 
devastatingly by Voltaire centuries ago, 
and the faith of Nobel prize-winning 
market economists in the unfettered 
majesty of their god. 
2. Insurance Code section 1861.05 
(added by Proposition 103, section 3). 
Note that the prior approval review of 
insurance rates is triggered by a proposed 
rate adjustment of 7% for personal lines of 
insurance or 15% for commercial lines. 
However, the Commissioner has the 
authority to entertain objections by others 
to rate increases which do not meet this 
test, or to sua sponte examine a rate on his 
or her own. Ideally, the Commissioner 
would develop a test by rule making keyed 
to the degree of competition extant in a 
subline of insurance where a rate change 
is sought. 
3. Five examples of regulations 
delayed by this undifferentiated 
moratorium-allegedly excluding "health 
and safety" rules-are those which would: 
require infant formula manufacturers to 
report consumer complaints and results of 
tests for microbiological contaminants; 
tighten rules for preventing industrial ac-
cidents involving toxic chemicals; 
prohibit sale of child safety seats that are 
dangerous when adjusted in certain seat 
positions; prevent hospitals from using 
inability to pay as a reason for denying 
treatment to emergency patients or women 
in labor; and require warning labels on 
certain toys, balloons, marbles, and other 
children's playthings with small parts. 
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